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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CONTINENTAL BUS SYSTE~r,
INC., a Corporation; DENVER.:;
SAI1T LAKE-PACIFIC STAGES,
INC., a Corporation; GARRETT
FREIGHT LINES, INC., a Corporation: 1\tliLNE TRUCK LINES,
INC., a Corporation; PALMER
BROTHERS, INCORPORATED, a
Coporation, and RIO GRANDE
\t<)T()RWAY, INC., a Corporation.
Plaintiffs,

_,·s.-

Ca.se
No.10107

PUBT.JIC SERVICE COMiliiSSION
OF UTAH and HAL S. BENNETT,
DOXALD HACKING a.nd RAYMOND W. GEE, Commissioners of
the Public Service Commission of
Utah, and WYCOFF C01\IP ANY,
INCOR.PORATED, a Corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS,
PlTBI.jiC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
~\ND ITS COMMISSIONERS
ST'"\TE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an appeal from an order of the Public Service Commission of Utah dismissing the complaint of
plaintiffs and the order to show cause issued thereon.
Such complaint prayed for an order vacating bi-monthly
l
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

temporary permits which had been issued by the Commission to Wycoff Company, Incorporated, and determining that thesame should not be issued in the future
since the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue temporary authority to common, as distinguished from contract carriers.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BEFORE THE
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
The complaint of Continental Bus System, Inc., and
Denver-Salt Lake-Pacific Stages, Inc., prayed for an
order vacating the temporary permit issued to Wycoff
Company, Incorporated, hereinafter called Wycoff, authorizing it to transport contractors' and machinery
dealers' repair parts, supplies and equipment between
all points and places in the State of Utah. Upon hearing, in which other common carriers joined as intervenors and complainants, the Public Service Commission
dismissed the complaint and declared its order to show
cause satisfied. This appeal relates to such order.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek to sustain the order of the Public
Service Commission dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and
vacating the Commission's order to show cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants agree with plaintiffs' statement of facts.
However, with respect to the paragraph on page 6 of

2
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plaintiffs' brief, the court's attention is directed to the
lt\ngthy discussion on pages 9 through 17 of the record
concemin~ the Commission's practice with respect to the
filing with the Commission of a copy of the contract betw(lcn <'-nrrier and shipper. It appears from this discussion that the Commission usually requires the filing
of n copy of the contract when it issues permanent contract authority, but that when a temporary permit is
issued the filing of a copy of the contract is not always
n\quired hy the Commission.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
ASSUMING THAT THE AUTHORITY
GRANTED WYCOFF IS COMMON CARRIER
AUTHORITY, THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ACTED WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION IN ISSUING TEMPORARY PERl\IIITS
TO WYCOFF.
Under Point I of plaintiffs' brief, most of plaintiffs'
argument is directed toward showing that defendant
\V"ycoff Company, Incorporated, is a common carrier as
tli~tinguished from a contract carrier; that the temporary permits issued by the Public Service Commission to
'Vycoff are in reality temporary grants of common carrier authority; and that the Public Service Commission
exceeded its jurisdiction in granting temporary common
earrier authority, since Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, prondes that temporary permits may be granted to contract
carriers and there is no statute specifically authorizing
the granting of temporary permits to common carriers.
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Assuming that the authority granted Wycoff under
the temporary permits is common carrier authority, it is
defendants' contention that the Public Service Commission ha.s the power to issue temporary authority to Wycoff by virtue of the provisions of the Public Utilities
Act, namely Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1953, which reads as
follows:
''The commission is hereby vested 'vith power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of
the business of every such public utility in this
state, and to do a.ll things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which
are necessary or convenient in the exercise of
such power and jurisdiction. ''
Prior to the year 1927, common carriers were regulater under the Public Utilities Act. Subsection 14 of
Section 4782, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, defines a
common carrier as follows:
"The term 'common carrier,' when used in this
title, includes every railroad corporation; street
railroad corporation; automobile corporation; express corporation; dispatch, sleeping car, dining
car, drawing room car, fright, freight line, refrigerator, oil, stock, fruit, car loaning, car renting,
carloading and every other car corporation or person, their lessees, trsutees, receivers, or trustees
appointed by any court whatsoever, operating for
public service within this state; and every corporation or person, their lessees, trustees, receivers,
or trustees appointed by any court whatsoever engaged in the transportation of persons or property
for public service, over regular routes between
points within this state." (emphasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Subsection 28 of said Section defines a public utility as
fo11ows:
''The term 'public utility,' ""hen used in this
title, includes every common carrier, gas corporation, automobile corporation, electric corporation, teleg-raph corporation, water corporation,
heat corporation, and warehouseman where the
service is performed for or the commodity delivered to the public or any portion thereof. The
term 'public or any portion thereof,' as herein
used means the public generally, or any limited
portion of the public including a person, private
corporation, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, to which the service is performed or to which the commodity is delivered,
• • •." (emphasis added)
It is to be noted that while common motor carriers
\vere subject to the Public Utilities Act, private or contrn<lt carriers "·ere not, as they do not transport persons
or property for ''public service.''
In the case of State v. Nelson (1925) 238 Pac. 237,
239, this court said :
'' • • • The principles of law announced in the
cited cases are readily admitted. However, we
think they are not applicable to the case in hand.
They do not on similar facts and circumstances
shO\\' that one situated or conditioned as "~as the
defendant is a common carrier. They all recognize that a common or public carrier is one \vho,
by virtue of his business or calling or holding out,
undertakes for compensation to transport persons
or property, or both, from one place to another for
all such as may choose to employ him. Running
through the cases is a recognition of the dominant
element of public service, serving and carrying
5
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all persons indifferently who apply for passage
or for shipment of goods or freight. To constitute
a common carrier such element is also requisite
under the Utilities Act. It defines a 'common carrier,' as the term is used therein, to include among
others every automobile corporation engaged in
the transportation of persons or property for public service over regular routes between points
within the state and an automobile rorporation
to include every corporation or person engaged
in or transacting business of transporting passengers or freight, merchandise, or other property, for compensation by means of automobiles
or automobile stages on public streets, roads, or
highways along established routes within the
state. Public service, as distinguished from mere
private service, is thus a necessary factor to constitute a common carrier. Such element, in portions of the act, is not as clearly expressed as
might be. Nevertheless, it necessarily is implied.
It is only by the presence of such factor or element that the commission has power or authority
to regulate or control such business. Eliminating
it, its power and jurisdiction are gone. * * * So,
if the business or concern is not public serYice,
where the public has not a legal right to the use
of it, where the business or operation is not open
to an indefinite public , it is not subject to the
jurisdiction or regulation of the commission. * *
f; ' '

See also Denver arnd Rio Grande Railw·ay v. Li'Mk
(Utah), 56 F. 2d 957.
In 1927 the Legislature gave the Public Utilities
Commission authority to regulate "That are no'v called
contract motor carriers by enacting Chapter 42, La,vs of
Utah 1927, which provided that all "automobile companies for hire must obtain a permit from the Public
6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

{;tilitiP~ Commission." This apparently included both

rommon and contract carriers. The section of this Act
pPrtaining to vermits "·as amended in 1929 by Chapter
9-l, Laws of lftah 1929, by the addition of the following

phrase:
"• • • This Act shall not apply to an automobile corporation, public utility or common carrier, as defined in Section 4782, Compiled Laws of
Utah 1917, holding a certificate of convenience and
necessity issued by the Public Utilities Commission of thr State of Utah, when such automobile
corporation, public utliity or common carrier is
operating between the points de signa ted in said
ePrtificate. ''
In 1933 the Legislature enacted a Motor Transport
:\.ct (Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1933), which contained
provisions quite similar to present law. In 1935 the 1933
.Art \vas repealed and the law pertaining to motor vehicle transportation in substantially the same form as it
is today "·as enacted by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1935,
including for the first time a provision for temporary
permits for contract carriers (Section 54-6-10, U.C.A.
1953) and the following provision, Section 54-6-2, U.C.A.
-q

19 'lt) :
'' .AJl common motor carriers of property or
passengers as defined in this act are hereby derlared to be common carriers within the meaning
of the public. utility laws of this state, and subject to this act and to the la".,.s of this state, inrluding the regulation of all rates and charges now
in force or that hereafter may be enacted, pertaining to public utilities and common carriers as
far as applicable, and not in conflict herewith.''
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The reason for reciting the foregoing legislative history of the ~iotor Carrier Act is to point out that
since the beginning of motor vehicle transportation common carriers have been regulated as public
utilities. The laws adopted subsequent to 1927 brought
contract motor carriers under the regulation of what is
now the Public Service Commission, and added additional
provisions for the regulation of common motor carriers.
With respect to common motor carriers, the present I\iotor Carrier Act is merely supplemental to the Public
Utilities Act. Common motor carriers are subject to
both Acts, while contract carriers are subject to the one.
It was necessary, therefore, for the Legislature to make
provision for the granting of temporary permits to contract carriers, as the Public Service Commission already
had such authority with respect to common carriers under
the Public Utilities Act, namely, Section 54-4-1, U.C.A.
1953.
Not only does Section 54-6-2, U.C.A. 1953, specifically
declare common motor carriers to be subject to the
Public Utilities act, but it is a well recognized principle
of statutory construction that statutes in pari materia are
to be construed so that effect is given to each. According to 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 530:
'' • • • On the presumption that whenever the
Legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the
previous statutes relating to the same subject
matter, it is held that in the absence of any express
repeal or amendment therein, the ne'v provision
was enacted in accord with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes, and they all
should be constructed together. Provisions in an
8
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\vhich are omitted in another act relating to
the same sbject matter will be applied in a proCf'Pding undrr the other a.ct, 'vhen not inconsistPnt with its purposes. Prior statutes relating
to the snme subject matter are to be compared
\\·ith the ne\\' provision; and if possible by reasonable construction, both are to be so construted that
effect iH given to every provision of each. • • • ''

H<'t

The plaintiffs argue that if Section 54-4-1, U .C.A.
1953, which is set forth in full on page 4 of this brief,
c.ould grant so fundamental a power as the right to issue
n type of operating authority, it would be an unlawful
delegation of power, as there is not the slightest standard
or criteria set forth in the statute pursuant to which the
po,ver is to be exercised. The validity of the section is
not before the court, and as 'vas said by this court in
Nort,ille ''· State Ta.r Commission, 97 P. 2d 937, 939:
"Statutes duly enacted by the legislature are
presumed to be constitutional and valid. • * *
''The duty of this court in construing and interpreting legislative acts is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. • • •
'' .A.s stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec.. 241, at p. 320: 'In the exposition of
a statute the intention of the law-maker will prevail ov-er the literal sense of the terms; and its
reason and intention will prevail over the strict
letter. When the words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the context; from
the occasion and necessity of the law; from the
mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to
what is consonant with reason and good discretion. ' ''
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Furthermore, this court said in State v. Salt Lake
City Public Board of Education, 13 Utah 2d 56, 368 P.
2d 468, 469:
''If there be any uncertainty as to the meaning and the proper application of the statute,
either from its language or its failure to make express provision for circumstances in which it may
be found to operate, it is proper to look both to
the purpose for which it was created, and to the
practical aspects of its operation in order to
assist in determining the legislative intent.''
Also see State v. Melton, et ux., (Wash. 1952), 248 P.
2d 892.
Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted in 1917
and Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, in 1935. The language
of Section 54-4-1 indicates that the Legislature must have
anticipated that the Public Service Commission would
be faced with some emergencies and unforeseen circumstances wherein it would be necessary for the Commission to issue temporary permits or perform other acts
requiring the exercise of reasonable discretion, as the
section reads, in part :

' ' * * * and to do all things, whether herein
specifically designated or in addition thereto,
'vhich are necessary or concenient in the exercise
of such power and jurisdiction.''
added.)

(Emphasis

Throughout the years the Commission has found it
necessary to issue temporary permits to protect the pub-

10
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lie intPrest in unusual situations. Tn its Findings of Fact,
thP Commission said (R-104):
The f>u blic Servce Commission is charged
with the duty of seeing to it that the public receives efficient and economic transportation service. This is also true respecting other types of
utility service, electric, communication, water,
steam, etc. Constantly there arises situations
\vhere some form of temporary authority must in
the public interest be issued to meet the needs and
the requirements of the public. During "rar time as
an illustration, Defense Transportation Administration suddenly embargoed the use of railroad
tank cars for the transportation of bulk petroleum
products in the western area; this situation resulting from the discontinuance of water petroleum carriers plying between the gulf area and the
.A.tla.ntic seaboard. The need for transportation
suddenly was aeute in Utah and the Utah Commission "ras active in soliciting carriers and equipment to perform highway transportation of petroleum and petroleum products, in bulk, and the
Commission issued 'vhat it denominated war duration authority on a temporary war emergency
basis, to meet the requirements. This authority
was not denominated certificate of convenience
and necesesity or contract carrier permit.
4

'

"It clearly appears necessary at times to issue
a form of temporary authority in order to ascertain the financial feasibility of a needed public
serYice. This situation has arisen, for instance,
in the case of mass transportati'On service in the
cities of Provo and in Ogden. No carrier in these
eases is "Tilling to accept the obligation and burden
of performing the needed public service without
first operating on a trial basis the proposed
service.
11
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''The Federal Government sold the Clearfield
Naval Supply Depot property to private interests.
The property contained various warehouses and
the area is now designated the Freeport Distribution Center. The necessity of continuing under
private operation certain utility services urgently
needed such as railroad, telephone, electric and
steam plant plant and heating services required
the immediate issuance of utility authority, particularly in respect to the steam plant operation.
The Commission issued a form of temporary authority to meet the situation.''
With respect to defendant Wycoff, the Commission
said:
''Processing and hearing of these various rna tters has been complicated, if in fact not made impossible, by reason of the various other proceedings involving Wycoff Company, Incorporated,
such as the testing by Wycoff of the constitutionality of the Motor Carrier Act, the litigation respecting violation of Commission Orders, and the
assessment of penalties by the Commission and
others.'' (R-99)
''One of the plaguing things from the Commission's viewpoint and the public interest in this
matter is to provide the expedited service sought
by shippers without destroying the very thing that
make the service valuable, for instance : Should
the gro"\vth in the volume of business be such that
the drops clearly increase and should these drops
be made from a loaded truck, the schedules would
be slow and cumbersome; that would not be suitable for the delivery of newspapers and the service would undoubtedly become the usual truck
service whereby the shipments are accumulated

12
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nnd loade•d on an over-the-road truck for breaking bulk at certain terminal areas and delivery
by other vehicles. This is the typical truck operation and is pretty generally adequately furnished
hy true king companies serving the State of Utah.''
(R-100)

•'In the meantime, machinery companies, Associated General Contractors, and pipe line contractors have urgently insisted on the need for
the expedited, high velocity services of Wycoff
Company, Incorporated, on emergency shipments
of machinery repair parts, supplies and equipment. The service as rendered by Wycoff Co~&
pany, Incorporated, as to speed and convenience
is not fully available from any other public carrier. This matter, of course, must be determined,
brought to a conclusion by formal hearings and
any decision here should not be treated as granting or denying any permanent authority, nor as a
determination that there will be any reissuing of
temporary authority to Wycoff Company, Incorporated, or anybody else." (R-106)
Thus, it ran be seen that it has been the practice of
the Commission through the years to issue temporary
authority to common carriers and other public utilities.
It is also apparent that the temporary authority issued
to Wycoff 'vas not based on an arbitrary or capracious
art of the Commission, but rather on circumstances 'vhich
made it neresesary if the public good "'"as to be served.
Certainly. the Commission oYer a long period of time
has giYen a practical interpretation to Section 54-4-1,
U.C ....-\. 1953, and the Commission's interpretation is entitled to considerable weight in a consideration of the

13
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statute which, admittedly, is not entirely clear.
Am. Jur., Statutes, p. 309, it is stated:

In 50

"*

* * The practical construction given a statute for a long period of time has been considered
strong evidence of the meaning of the la\Y. Such
contemporaneous or practical construction is
treated by the courts as of importance, and as
entitled to great weight, respect, and persuasiY<-)
influence. * * *"
This court has recognized the doctrine of contemporaneous construction. Alexander v. Bennett, 5 U. 2d 163,
298 P. 2d 823 ;Murdock v. J.l!abey, 59 Utah 346, 203 Pac.
651. The fact that the Commission designated Wycoff's
temporary authority as a ''temporary permit'' instead of
a "temporary certificate of convenience and necessity"
should be of no great consequence. For a period of time
the Utah la'v designated the authority as a "permit" and
the Commission has merely carried on that nomenclature.
Section 76-5-2, Revised Statutes of 1933, provided:
''No motor transport corporation shall establish or begin operation of a line or route outside of
cities or towns or any extension of any line or
route outside of cities Or towns writhout first haYing obtained from the Public Utilities Commission a permit therefor. * * * ''
Also, the fact that the Commission referred to Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, as authority for issuing temporary permits should not be given undue \Yeight, as in
its Findings of Fact the Commission also referred to Section 54-4-1, U.C.A. 1933, saying (R. 106):

'' * * * This section, of course,

i~

so broad as to
become some"\\'"hat meaningless, but in any event
14
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it must empower the ( iommis~ion to exercise its
discretion in rPspect to the issuance of forms of
temporary authority in transportation and other
utility services even though it be done without
formal hearing, and we are certain that the Commission is legally and properly pursuing its authority 'vhich "~e have discussed above.

''It may be that the legislature should more
clearly and definitely define and specify such authority. We would have no objection to this.
''An issue has been made in this case with respeet to the reissuing of the temporary authority
here under consideration to Wycoff Company, Incorpora ted, every 60 days 'vithout a hearing. This
may appear on its face as arbitrary and capricious
action on the part of the Commission. However,
as set forth above, this particular rna tter has been
before the Commission almost constantly for a.
long period of time and has got involved "~i th
other matters to the point where a full hearing
has been difficult to carry forward." (R-106)
In conclusion, if 've assume that the temporary authority granted \\Tyroff is a common motor carrier authority, it is the position of defendants that the Commission had implied power to issue the temporary authority under Section 54-4-1 of the Public Utilities Act.

POINT II.
IX THE .A.LTERNATIVE, .._\SSU1IIXG THAT
THE .._\.UTHORITY GRANTED WYCOFF IS
C.1XTR.A.CT C..ARRIER AUTHORITY, THE
I)UBLIC SJ1~R\TICE COM~IISSION ACTED
\\~THIX ITS JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
TE~IPOR. A.RY PER~IITS TO WYCOFF.

15
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In the alternative, it is defendants' position that, if
the Public Service Commission did not have implied
power to issue temporary permits to Wycoff as a common motor carrier, it did have authority to issue the
pen:pits as a contract motor carrier under the provisions
of Section 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953, which section specifically
provides that a temporary permit may be issued to contract motor carriers.
There is nothing in the Utah law prohibiting a carrier from holding both a common carrier certificate and
a contract carrier permit. It does appear, however, from
cases in which this question has arisen, that while a
carrier may engage in both common and contract carriage, it may not do so when offering the same service
it gives as a common carrier. This general rule is stated
in 13 Am. J ur. 2d, Carriers, p. 644, as follows:
''The regulatory statutes in many states, providing for certificates of convenience and necessity for common carriers by motor vehicle and permits for contract carriers by motor vehicle,
prohibit the same carrier from operating both as
a common carrier and as a contract carrier, although it has been held that such a statute does not
prohibit a carrier from engaging in both common
and contract carriage, so long as the same goods
are not carried bet,veen the same points in both
capacities. ' '
See Alves v. Public Service Commission of Californ,ia, 260 P. 2d 785; Brothers v. State Industrial Commission, (Oreg.) 12 P. 2d 302.
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'rhe distinction bet,veen common and contract motor
('nrrierR is not ahva.ys clear and precise. 1\c.tually, a contract is involved every time goods are shipped by either
type ot' carrier. The primary distinction appears to be
that the common carrier holds itself out as a carrier to
anyoJH' who desires its services, whereas the contract
cnrriPr may be selective in those with 'vhom it deals and
refuse service to the general public.
rrhe difficulty encountered in determining whether a
c.arrier is a common or eontract carrier is illustrated by
the ('ase of .lfcCarthy v. Public Service Commission, 111
Utah 489, 184 P. 2d 220, in 'vhich this court had to make
surh a determination. In that case, the defendants were
haulers of sand, gravel, loose earth, and cement in bulk,
w·ho had been issued certificates of convenience and net'l\ssity as eommon carriers. The plaintiff challenged the
Commission's Order, claiming that defendants "~ere contract carriers. The evidence disclosed that, while in general the defendants negotiated their contracts 'vith intlividual contractors or customers, at least some of them
offered their services to anyone desiring it. Defendant
Rowley testified as follo,vs:
''Q. Why do you ask for a certificate of convenience and necessity¥ Doesn't a contract carrier's permit fit your situation~
.J.~.

No, because I might work for seven different contractors in the space of a half a day. In
other words, I am holding myself forth as a public
trucker. I will have any one of the trucks on seven
different jobs working for seven different people
in the space of one day.''
H
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In holding that defendants were contract motor carriers, ~Ir. Justice Wolfe in a concurring opinion, \vhich
was also concurred in by Chief Justice ~icDonough, sn id :
''These applicants are contract motor carriers.
The public needs their services as contract motor
carriers. I see no reason why general contract
carrier permits could not be issued after the required notice and hearing, which general permits
would allow these carriers to haul sarid and gravel
and cement anywhere in the state (or in specific
areas, depending on the showing made.) * * * ''
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Wade said:
'' * * * The showing here was to the effect that
they had been serving the public generally, that
wherever there was work to be done of their type
they proceeded to do it, and that their services
were not con:fiined to a few individuals. * * * ''

The difficulty in distinguishing contract from common carriers is further illustrated in the case of Realty
Purcha.sing Comp·any v. Public Service Commission, 9
U. 2d. 375, 345 P. 2d 606. In that case the defendant Salt
Lake Transportation Company contracted with four airlines for the transportation of passengers to and from
the Salt Lake airport. Defendant's compensation came
from charging each passenger $1.00, and the only control granted the airlines \Yas the right to require minimum
standards of service and insurance coYerage. In su:-;taining the Commission's Order granting the defendant
a. contract carrier permit, Chief Justice Crockett said:

'' * * * The question as to the character of the operation and its classification is primarily for the
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( iommission with its expertise in this field. It has
the responsi hili ty to the public of supervising and
rPh"Ulating carrier services in general. It found
that the defendant met the requirements and authorized it to perform the service which it deemed
a proper one in the over-all transportation picture. It does not seem too important by what
tith"' it is called."
Again, the court's opinion was not unanimous, District ,Judge Hoyt entering his dissent with an opinion
thn t defendant was a common carrier.
\Vycoff's certificate of convenience and necessity No.
1162-Sub. 2, authorizes Wycoff to transport general commodities of 100 pounds or less in weight in express service between all points and places in the State of Utah,
subject to the restriction that Wycoff shall not transport
surh commodities in excess of 500 pounds on a weight
ha~is of such express items on any one schedule. It is to
be noted that the temporary permit issued to Wycoff
does not permit the transportation of general commodities, but is limited to ''contractors and machinery dealers repair parts, supplies and equipment in emergency
~hipments to repair or job locations which may oceasionally exceed 100 pounds per shipment limits and/ or total
Pxpress " . hich by reason of said emergency shipment may
occasionally exceed 500 pounds of express on one authorized schedule.'' (R. 103 and permits in exhibit.)
From these restrictions in Wycoff's temporary permit, it ran be seen that the goods Wycoff can transport is
limited to a particular type; that they can be transported
only in emergencies and 'vhen Wyeoff's load occasionally
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exceeds the 100 and 500 pounds limits; and that they can
be transported only to repair or job locations. It is eYident ,therefore, that Wycoff's services under the temporary permit are performed for only an extremely limited
segment of the public, and that they are more in the nature of a contract carrier's authority than a common carrier's. Also, even though Wycoff may carry the same
type of goods under its permanent common carrier certificate, there is such a definite distinction between the
service it is permitted to perform under its temporary
permit and those it may perform as a common carrier,
that there is no real conflict between the t"To authorities
granted.

POINT III.
THE C01\1MISSION DID NOT ACT ABITRARILY NOR CAPRICIOUSLY IN ISSUING
TEMPORARY PERMITS IN CONSECUTIVE
ORDER OVER A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE YEARS.
The Utah law is silent with respect to the issuance of
temporary p·ermits in consecutive order. Section 54-6-10,
U.C.A. 1953, provides that temporary, seasonal or emergency permits may be issued for a period not greater than
sixty days, and Section 54-4-1 of the Public Utilities Act
does not specifically mention temporary permits. It is
certainly conceivable that an emergency or the need for
temporary authority could last for three years or longer.
As was pointed out in the Commission's Findings of Fact
(R
), during 'Vorld War II, temporary authority 'vas
granted to carriers able to transport petroleum and petroleum products in bulk.
20
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With respect to the question before us, the Commis~ion stated in its Findings of Fact that in other cases
heard hy the Commission many public ''itnesses had
tt·~t ified ns to the need of a high-Yelocity emergency type
service rendered on a seven-day per week basis (R. 100,
106). Thf' (Jommission stated further that it was conC(.lnled about the need for such service but that if the
number of drops made by Wycoff should increase very
much, they \vould have to be made from loaded trucks
with the result that the schedules \vould be slow, the expedited service could not be rendered, and the service would
be the same as the typical truck operations adequately
furnished by other carriers (R. 100). It stands to reason
that if this should oceur, the temporary or emergency
authority could be quickly terminated by the Commission.

In vie\\y of the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission acted in the public's best interest and that its
practical method of meeting the temporary need or emerg-ency \vas not arbitrary nor capricious. Certainly, the
Commission is in the best position to judge the duration
of the need for which it issued the temporary authority.

CONCLUSION
The Public Service Commission's action, in granting
temporary authority to Wycoff, was in the best interest
of the public and this court should sustain the Commission·~ order.
The Commission had jurisdiction and
power to issue such authority either as temporary common carrier authority or as temporary eontract motor

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

carrier authority. As was said by Chief Justice Crockett, in Realty Purchasing Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra: ''The question as to the character of the
operation and its classification is primarily for the Commission with its expertise in this field. ,.. * * It does not
seem too important by what title it is called.''
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

H. WRIGHT VOLKER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants,
Public Service Commission
and Its Commissioners.
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